South Korea is being more deeply integrated into U.S.-led regional war planning that extends beyond peninsula defense.
Is South Korea Being Prepared as a “Launching Pad” for a U.S.-Led War in East Asia?
My answer is: Yes.
Here are the reasons why.
Last week, during a closed-door discussion themed “Korea as Strategic Key Terrain During Competition, Crisis, and Conflict,” held as part of the Honolulu Defense Forum, General Xavier Brunson, Commander of U.S. Forces Korea and the ROK–U.S. Combined Forces Command, highlighted the “centrality” of South Korea in U.S. security strategy in the Indo-Pacific.
Korea, according to Brunson, is “the only United States force assigned to the Asian continent inside the First Island Chain.”
He reportedly added that if all U.S. and ROK forces and planning remain tied only to the Korean Peninsula, enemies will see Korea as predictable and limited. The ROK–U.S. alliance then loses strategic flexibility and the ability to influence events in Northeast Asia beyond Korea.
“When we moor ourselves to the peninsula, when that mythology is allowed to continue to exist, what we do is present fewer dilemmas to the adversaries of the region… We show ourselves to be less able and less capable of projecting power from the peninsula.”
The problem is that the current Korean government under President Lee Jae Myung, who prefers a balancing act” (China–Korea–Japan cooperation), is not enthusiastic about Korea being involved in a U.S.-led war.
Brunson is working around the clock on propaganda, as a geopolitical analytical points out:
“He [Brunson,] has to pressure, bully, and persuade Koreans to sacrifice themselves in support of U.S. attempts to destroy China. If Ukrainians can die for America, why not Koreans?”
Case in point: on January 12, on the sidelines of the forum, the USFK commander held bilateral talks with Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi and Gen. Romeo Brawner, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to discuss regional security issues.
The two sides reportedly reaffirmed the importance of strengthening Japan–U.S.–ROK defense cooperation for “peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific,” language commonly used to justify U.S. and Japanese regional aggression focused on China.
Why did the commander of the ROK–U.S. Combined Forces—who bears primary responsibility for the defense of the Korean Peninsula—meet Japan’s defense minister at all without ROK?
Japan, as part of the U.S.–Japan alliance, has no formal connection to the operational control structure of the ROK–U.S. Combined Forces Command. In this context, Brunson’s actions can reasonably be seen as distorting the chain of command.
Answer?: Indeed, the two are—behind South Korea’s back—synchronizing their militarism.
General Brunson has previously described South Korea as “a fixed aircraft carrier between China and Japan” and has openly called for the ROK military to play a larger role beyond the Korean Peninsula, advocating expanded “strategic flexibility” for U.S. Forces Korea. Meanwhile, Japan has intensified military activity near Taiwan and has even committed to possible intervention in a Taiwan contingency.
What progressive experts say about Brunson:
As far as Brunson, the U.S. commander of occupation forces in South Korea, is concerned, South Korea is viewed through the “tactical concept of the ROK as a ‘launching pad’ for U.S. forces attacking other nations.”
“[South Korea] ‘ought’ to be a launching pad for the U.S. military to attack any nation (specifically now, China) in the Asia-Pacific, thereby embroiling South Korea in its war of aggression. South Koreans should have no say in the matter. Indeed, they should be supporting any U.S. acts of violence in Asia.”
Of course, the idea of using Korea as a “launching pad” is not new—Japan did it first:
“Seized as a ‘launching pad’ for Japan’s invasion of the Chinese mainland, Jeju [in South Korea] was a stopover in the Imperial Army’s infamous march to Nanjing in 1937. In the 1930s, Jeju people were conscripted to build Altteureu Airfield, a key refueling site for Japanese forces. Some died in the process. Yet even as they too were victims, Jeju islanders have repeatedly apologized to the people of Nanjing for their role in facilitating Imperial Japan’s atrocities.” — Christine Hong
And there is the Vietnam War. During the U.S. war in Vietnam, South Korea served as a launching pad–providing troops and official US military logistics system and facilities.
My second question: “Will the government in Seoul be strong enough to resist the U.S., reclaim sovereignty, and avoid this fate?”
My answer is: No.
Take, for instance, the latest development that provides further evidence: permanent combined commands and growing pressure. Recently, the Combined Ground Component Command (CGCC), which integrates the command and control of South Korean and U.S. ground forces, has been permanently institutionalized and began full-scale operations last month.
Previously activated only during wartime, the CGCC now operates in peacetime as well—a development seen as bringing the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) one step closer.
Permanent component commands are now in place for the ground forces, navy, air force, and Marine Corps, with two additional permanent commands—Special Operations and Military Intelligence Support—also being pursued. The Ministry of National Defense describes these steps as progress toward a “conditions-based transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON).”
However, embedding combined command structures into the peacetime force posture further entrenches alliance-dependent command practices and reduces space for independent ROK military decision-making, raising concerns that OPCON transfer may become largely symbolic—in other words, more U.S. forces embedded in the Korean military.
With permanent institutionalization, some U.S. personnel are now assigned to the Combined Battle Staff even in peacetime, working alongside their ROK counterparts. Both sides now operate from the same offices during peacetime. Starting with the upcoming Freedom Shield (FS) ROK–U.S. combined exercise in March, the CGCC will jointly plan operations and conduct training together.
To sum up: What does that mean?
- Embedding joint planning at the component command level may de facto align ROK forces more closely with U.S. regional strategies, even if OPCON is officially “transferred”—a point implicit in both official reporting and external expert warnings.
- Together, these developments indicate that South Korea is being more deeply integrated into U.S.-led regional war planning that extends beyond peninsula defense. This trend raises serious concerns about growing pressure on South Korea to participate in potential Taiwan-related conflicts and about the erosion of autonomous defense decision-making under the expanding trilateral military framework.
- Under the pretext of “modernizing the ROK–U.S. alliance,” defense spending is rising steeply, the decision has been made to introduce nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, and South Korea has agreed to expand the scope of joint ROK–U.S. military operations beyond the peninsula.
- South Korea’s core assets—key manufacturing industries and hundreds of billions of dollars in capital—are being siphoned off to the United States.
- The country’s fate is reduced to that of a pawn on a battlefield chessboard, decided unilaterally by Washington.
South Korea is being prepared as a “launching pad” for a U.S.-led war in East Asia, and the government in Seoul is not strong enough to resist the U.S., reclaim sovereignty, and avoid this fate.
~ Simone Chun is a researcher and activist focusing on inter-Korean relations and U.S. foreign policy in the Korean Peninsula. She has served as an assistant professor at Suffolk University, a lecturer at Northeast University and an associate in research at Harvard University’s Korea Institute.
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