The US-backed 'Meghri Corridor initiative' seeks to isolate Iran, undercut Russia, and entrench Turkish, Azerbaijani, and Israeli influence, but Tehran insists the ‘American corridor’ will be dead and buried.
On 8 August, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and US President Donald Trump signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) outlining seven points to advance a so-called peace agreement in the South Caucasus. Bilateral deals between Washington and both states accompanied the accord.
The MoU advocates opening borders and transport routes, reinforcing Armenia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and jurisdiction – with reciprocity vaguely promised. Baku inserted the word “unimpeded” to describe its sought-after link to the Nakhichevan exclave, paired with “reciprocal benefits” for Yerevan.
Under the deal, the Meghri route – dubbed the Trump Route for Peace & Prosperity (TRIPP) – will be operated and controlled by US and foreign contractors, while Armenian railway access through Nakhichevan remains under Azerbaijani control.
This imbalance leaves Yerevan with fewer assurances over TRIPP’s security. “Unimpeded” likely means operators will deal directly with Azerbaijani traffic, with only periodic reporting to Armenian authorities. Such ambiguity could delay the peace agreement’s conclusion or pressure Armenia to cede further operational control.
Armenia’s former foreign minister Vartan Oskanian wrote on his Facebook page that the country fell into a trap, noting that Iran has openly warned it will not tolerate any foreign presence in Syunik, describing the region as Armenia’s strategic lifeline and a vital part of the north–south axis. Turning it into a geopolitical bargaining chip, he said, endangers both Armenia’s security and regional stability.
Russia: A sleeping bear with an open eye
While mainstream narratives blame Russia’s declining role in the South Caucasus on its military focus in Ukraine, this ignores that it was Yerevan that prohibited the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) from defending Armenia in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020 or during the short 2022 border flare-up.
Pashinyan himself made clear during the 44-day war that he did not want CSTO intervention, later – astoundingly – complaining post-defeat that “the CSTO has not fulfilled and is not fulfilling its obligations towards Armenia.” That complaint was political theater – part of a mission aligned with his western backers.
Pashinyan, seen as a product of a western-backed color revolution, came to power urging young people to throw themselves under buses in the name of “peaceful protest.” Since the 1990s, Yerevan, like Baku, has been steadily penetrated by western NGOs. The brief 2022 clashes changed little; by then, Pashinyan had already shown his political hand.
The withdrawal of the Russian troops from Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 and Pashiyan's blocking of the Russian-led alliance CSTO to defend Armenia against continued Azerbaijani aggression in 2021 and 2022 pushed confused Armenians to question the alliance and look for alternative security partners.
Moreover, the recent tension (arrests and detention of their respective journalists in both countries) between Azerbaijan and Russia further politically obstructed Russia, with Moscow no longer viewed as the ultimate power-broker in the region.
Analysts argue that Trump’s brokered agreement would sideline Russia, stripping it of the role it once dominated in the region for the last two centuries. Russia’s Duma member Kostantin Zatulin mentioned that the agreement aims at “squeezing Russia out of the Caucasus.”
Some even went further, calling it a “geopolitical blow” for Moscow. Russia’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova’s comments highlighted that Russia is interested in regional stability and diplomatically called for the returning back to the regional 3+3 platform as if the South Caucasus was a region far from “Russia’s abroad.”
Russia’s South Caucasus Railway subsidiary still operates Armenia’s network under the 10 November 2020 trilateral statement, which also placed Russian border guards in southern Armenia to secure transit between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Even if a US company runs the Meghri–Nakhichevan Corridor, Russia’s railway operation secures its economic stake while Armenia would also have access to Iran and Russia through Azerbaijani railways. When Trump meets Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska on 15 August to discuss a Ukraine “territorial swap,” the corridor issue will likely surface. Moscow will aim to preserve its economic interests, possibly trading political concessions in the region.
Tehran vows to block US-NATO foothold in the Caucasus
Iran’s Foreign Ministry has welcomed the finalization of the peace agreement text, considering it a “significant step toward achieving lasting peace in the region.” But it also expressed concern over the foreign intervention near its border that would undermine regional stability and stressed the respect of the territorial integrity of neighboring states, hinting at its opposition to any territorial change with its border with Armenia.
Tougher messages from Iran came from Ali Akbar Velayati, the Iranian supreme leader’s senior advisor, who said that with or without Russia, Iran will thwart the creation of an “American corridor” in the South Caucasus.
Asked about an agreement that will grant the US a “99-year development lease on the corridor,” he stressed that this corridor will turn into a “graveyard of the mercenaries of Donald Trump.” It has been announced that Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian will be giving an official visit to Yerevan in the coming days.
General Yadollah Javani, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) deputy commander for political affairs, also issued a blistering statement headlined “Aliyev and Pashinyan on Zelensky’s Road to Misery.” He said their choice to invite the US, Britain, and NATO into the Caucasus via a century-long Zangezur Corridor lease was akin to “the strategic error by Zelensky” and will see them falling for the “gambler Trump’s trap.”
Unlike Ukraine’s war, which pitted Kiev only against Moscow, Javani warned that this move has united Iran, Russia, China, and India against Baku and Yerevan. This destructive act, he declared, “will not go unanswered.”
It is no more a secret that the establishment of TRIPP will enhance US regional influence while diminishing Iran’s access and traditional influence in the South Caucasus.
Ankara and Tel Aviv: Strategic beneficiaries
Washington’s scheme also strengthens Turkiye’s hand. As NATO’s bridge into the region, Turkiye can expand influence across the Black Sea–Caspian arc, advancing its Middle Corridor project and deepening ties with the “Turkic world.” While careful to avoid open confrontation with Russia and Iran, Ankara is boosting domestic missile production to bolster its autonomous posture.
For Israel, the corridor opens new operational depth. Analysts openly float an “Abraham Accords 2.0” extension into the South Caucasus. Baku and Tel Aviv already maintain close security cooperation, with the occupation state supplying arms and intelligence. This positions Tel Aviv to project power into Iran’s north, intensifying surveillance and encirclement.
Armenia is increasingly shifting toward western alliances, including deepening ties with the US and the EU, however, without concrete commitments in return. This alignment or shift not only limits Iran’s diplomatic space but also supports the development of alternative trade and energy routes that bypass Russian and Iranian territories.
By doing so, the US aims to bring Yerevan and Baku under its orbit to detach them from future commitments related to the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) that connects Russia to Iran and India. Thus, isolating two traditional regional actors from the South Caucasus would ultimately pave the way for the increase of influence of the only regional actor, which is Turkiye.
If implemented, TRIPP will reshape the South Caucasus. Armenia may secure short-term peace, but will hand Turkiye and Azerbaijan logistical and military advantages. Iran risks regional isolation unless it forges tighter links with Russia and Armenia, and brings China and India into a common front against the Neo-Ottomanism and the “pan-Turkic arc.”
Russia may retain some economic leverage through railway operations, but if the status quo tilts further toward the west and Turkiye, Moscow’s influence will erode.
The primary winners will be Ankara, Baku, and Tel Aviv – and behind them, Washington.
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